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COMMERCIAL LAW-UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE-PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS*
Article 9 of New Mexico's Uniform Commercial Code1 deals
with secured transactions. 2 In order for a security interest 3 in per-
sonal property or fixtures to be perfected under the article's system
of "notice filing"' certain formal requisites must be satisfied.
Section 9-203 (1) (b) provides that a non-possessory security in-
terest is enforceable only when "the debtor has signed a security
agreement' which contains a description of the collateral . "
Section 9-402 (1) sets forth the formal requirements of a financ-
ing statement 7 : ".4 financing statement is sufficient if it is signed by
* Strevell-Paterson Fin. Co. v. May, d/b/a Doe Holliday's Hock Shops, 77 N.M.
331, 422 P.2d 366 (1967).
1. The New Mexico version of the Uniform Commercial Code, N.M. Stat. Ann.
§§ 50A-1-101 to -9-507 (Repl. 1962), was originally based on the 1958 Official Text,
promulgated jointly by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. In 1967, the New Mexico statute was amended
to adopt most of the changes found in the 1962 Official Text.
All references to the New Mexico Code, will be designated U.C.C. and will omit
the complete statutory citation. Citation to "Comments" are those accompanying the
1962 Official Text.
2. U.C.C. § 9-101.
3. A "security interest" is the term that describes a creditor's interest. It acts as a
lien upon certain property of the debtor which secures payment in the event of a de-
fault by the debtor. U.C.C. § 1-201 (37).
4. Under the notice filing system of the Code (U.C.C. § 9-402), a simple financing
statement will suffice to perfect a creditor's security interest. Under most pre-Code
chattel-security and conditional sale statutes, the actual security agreement had to be
filed. The requisites for the security agreement and the financing statement are listed
in note 5 and note 7, infra. For a discussion of the notice filing system see Coogan,
Public Notice Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Other Recent Chattel Security
Laws, Including "Notice Filing," 47 Iowa L. Rev. 289 (1962). See also Vernon, The
Uniform Commercial Code: Some New Mexico Problems and Proposed Legislative
Solutions, 3 Natural Resources J. 487 (1964).
5. U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (h) : " 'Security agreement' means an agreement which creates
or provides for a security interest." U.C.C. § 9-203, Comment 1 states that the reduction
in formal requirements is patterned after the Uniform Trust Receipts Act; technical
requirements of acknowledgment, and accompanying affidavits, inherent in many
chattel mortgage statutes, are done away with. See also U.C.C. § 9-402, Comment 3 and
N.M. Laws 1925, ch. 25 (repealed 1962).
6. U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (b). These formal requirements are intended to serve as a
Statute of Frauds. A creditor will not be allowed to establish his security interest in
the collateral by parol evidence. U.C.C § 9-203, Comment 5.
7. This section further provides that a copy of the security agreement itself may
be filed "as a financing statement if it contains the above information and is signed
by both parties." § 9-402(5) says that a financing statement which is in "substantial
compliance" with the requirements of subsection (1) is effective, "even though it con-
tains minor errors which are not seriously misleading."
A security agreement, as such, may be valid when signed only by the debtor, but
it can only be filed as a financing statement when the creditor or secured party (usually
the same person) has also signed it. National-Dime Bank v. Cleveland Bros. Equipment
Co., 20 Pa. D. & C.2d 511 (1959), 1 U.C.C. Rptg. Serv. 454 (Callaghan).
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the debtor AND the secured party, gives an address of the secured
party from which information concerning the security interest may
be obtained, gives a mailing address of the debtor and contains a
statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of col-
lateral."8
A "signing" within the meaning of these sections is "any symbol
executed or adopted by a party with present intention to authenti-
cate a writing.' 9
Obviously, the security agreement has fewer formal requirements
than the financing statement. The main questions to be discussed in
this Comment are whether this difference is significant and whether
it should be respected by strict compliance with the wording of the
legislative mandate-the Code.
Strevell-Paterson Finance Company v. May, dibla Doc Holli-
day's Hock Shops,10 involved a transaction for the sale of a guitar
and an amplifier. On July 12, 1963, Chavez, the buyer, executed a
chattel mortgage" which described the guitar and amplifier as secu-
rity for the debt he owed the plaintiff-finance company. The chattel
mortgage was filed as a financing statement.' 2 Neither the signature
nor the address of plaintiff, as secured party, appeared on the chat-
tel mortgage. On November 8, 1963, Chavez traded in the guitar
and the previously mortgaged amplifier. Plaintiff filed this agree-
ment on June 29, 1964. On June 22, 1964, defendant received both
of these items from Chavez on a pawn. When Chavez subsequently
defaulted on payments, plaintiff claimed the right to take possession
of the collateral. Chavez then informed plaintiff of the pledge to
defendant and gave the claim tickets to plaintiff. When plaintiff de-
manded that defendant return the items, defendant refused, stating
that he had already sold them to a third party. Plaintiff brought this
suit for conversion. The trial court entered judgment for the plain-
tiff for $475, the value of the items. On appeal, the defendant argued
8. U.C.C. § 9-402 (1) Comment 2 states that "the notice itself indicates merely that
the secured party who has filed may have a security interest in the collateral described."
§ 9-208 provides a statutory procedure under which the secured party, at the debtor's
request, may be required to make disclosure concerning the nature and amount of the
security interest.
9. U.C.C. § 1-201 (39). See In Re Bengston, note 32 infra for a good interpretation
of the signature requirement.
10. 77 N.M. 331, 422 P.2d 366 (1967).
11. U.C.C. § 9-101, Comment; U.C.C. § 9-102, Comment 2. 77 N.M. at 334, 422
P.2d at 368:
The fact that an agreement offered for filing is denominated a "chattel mortgage"
is immaterial. The traditional forms of security agreements in use before the enact-
ment of . . . § 9-203, and § 9-402, . . .may continue to be used after their enactment.
12. See note 4 and note 7 supra.
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that the security interest was improperly perfected and was unen-
forceable since the plaintiff had failed to comply with the require-
ments of section 9-402 (1).13 The New Mexico Supreme Court re-
manded to the district court with direction to vacate the judgment
in favor of the plaintiff and enter a new judgment dismissing the
plantiff's complaint. 14
The result reached by the supreme court is unquestionably correct,
but the court's analysis and application of the Code is unfortunate
in that the court failed to consider all of the relevant sections of
the code. 5
The major error made by the supreme court was their assumption
that any "perfected" security interest in the first guitar automatically
attached to the new one for which it was traded without qualification.
The second financing statement should not have been considered by
the court since the filing occurred after the pledge to the defendant.
Section 9-306(3) is controlling on this issue.' 6 It provides for a con-
tinuation of perfection in identifiable proceeds from a sale, exchange,
or other disposition of collateral for ten days only unless a security
interest is also perfected in the proceeds. 17 Acknowledgement of
these sections by the Strevell court would have obviated the neces-
sity of even considering the omission of the secured party's signa-
ture and address from the financing statement. Assuming, however,
as the court did, that the second financing statement was valid, let us
consider their reasoning as to the signature and address require-
ments.
The court analyzed the instrument filed in terms of section
9-402 (1).18 They found, in Professor Gilmore's words, "no sen-
sible reason for the discrepancies between the formal requisites of
section 9-203 and section 9-402."' 9 Thus, they concluded that "the
13. See note 10 supra at 333, 422 P.2d at 368.
14. See note 10 supra at 332, 422 P.2d at 367.
15. For a critical analysis of the court's handling of the case, see Annot., Willier
and Hart, U.C.C. Rep. Digest § 9-402, A-19 (Supp. 1967) ; See also Editor's Note, 3
U.C.C. Rptg. Serv. 1094 (Callaghan 1967) ; Comment, Uniform Commercial Code-
Perfection of Security Interests-Notice filing Under Section 9-402, 39 Colo. L. Rev.
609 (1967) (contra).
16. U.C.C. § 9-306(3).
17. U.C.C. § 9-306(1): "'Proceeds' includes whatever is received when collateral
or proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise disposed of." See also Henson,
"Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 232, 238 (1965).
18. U.C.C. § 9-402. At the outset the court noted that since the guitar and amplifier
were primarily used by Chavez to perform in night clubs they were "equipment",
therefore, perfection by filing was required according to § 9-302(1) (d). This aspect of
the decision is quite sound. Section 9-109(2) defines goods as equipment which are
used primarily in business, including a profession.
19. 1 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property 346, 347 (1965).
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lack of the secured party's signature does not make the instrument
defective within the meaning of section 9-402 (1) .
In addition to citing Professor Gilmore's treatise, the court also
referred to section 1-10221 and Alloway v. Stuart,22 a Kentucky case
which involved the same type of signature problem as in Strevell2
The court in Alloway declared their policy not to interpret the then
newly enacted Code literally by saying that a temporary "period of
indulgence should be granted in connection with cases arising under
the Commercial Code" to allow businessmen a chance to become
familiar with its provisions. 2 4 That aspect of the Alloway decision
has been sharply criticized.25
Even prior to the Alloway decision, the Attorney General of
Kentucky had stated that the signature of the secured party was
essential to validity of a financing statement under section 9-402.26
The Kentucky court did not recognize this opinion or the case au-
thority from other jurisdictions which supports itY7
The same pattern appears in the Strevell case. The New Mexico
Attorney General had previously issued two opinions on the subject
of financing statements. 28 Both of these opinions made it quite clear
that a valid financing statement must be signed by both parties and
contain the other information listed in section 9-402.21 Most opinions
from other states are in accord with this view. 0
20. See note 10 supra at 335, 422 P.2d at 369.
21. U.C.C. § 1-102: (1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to pro-
mote its underlying purposes and policies. (2) Underlying purposes and policies of
this Act are (a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions ...
22. 385 S.W.2d 41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964).
23. Id. at 43. In that case, a chattel mortgage which lacked the secured party's
signature was filed as a financing statement. The court found the omission not to be
a fatal error because it could not have misled anyone. The case has been distinguished
as a minority interpretation of a technical and mandatory provision.
24. 385 S.W.2d at 44.
25. Comment, Uniform Commercial Code: Judicial Indulgence for Noncompliance
with Recently Enacted Technical Provisions, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 922, 924 (1965) ; Com-
ment, Uniform Commercial Code Section 9-402-Absence of Creditor's Handwritten
Signature Invalidates Financing Statement, 47 B.U.L. Rev. 292, 297 (1967).
26. Op. Att'y Gen., Ky. No. 623 (1963).
27. See note 32 infra.
28. Op. Att'y Gen., N.M. No. 62-2,-3 (1962). No. 62-2 adopts the financing state-
ment "form" set out in § 9-402(3), as sufficient to comply with § 9-402(1). Note, theterms "assignee" and "assignor" are reversed in the suggested forms where they appear
in parentheses.
29. Signatures and addresses of both the debtor and the secured party and a
description of the collateral are required.
30. See note 26 supra and note 38 infra. See also as representative of the majority
view, Op. Att'y Gen., Mo. No. 402 (1965), No. 49 (1966), 3 U.C.C. Rptg. Serv. 552
(Callaghan 1967) (photocopies valid) ; Op. Att'y Gen., N.M. No. 62-126 (1962), 1
U.C.C. Rptg. Serv. 748 (Callaghan 1962) (a carbon or photocopy of a signature is
[Vol. 8
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Aside from ignoring these opinions as, at least, some source of
authority, the New Mexico Supreme Court's total reliance on Gil-
more3' also precluded recognition of a substantial body of case law
which would have occasioned an opposite result on the issue of the
omitted secured party's signature.3 ' Generally, these cases illustrate
that omission of any one of the formal requisites specified in section
9-402 ( 1 ) " would be a serious error, not in "substantial compliance"
with the section. Even commentators who advocate a liberal inter-
pretation of section 9-402 agree that its few simple requisites should
be complied with.34
As further evidence of the fact that the Strevell court "read out"
valid) ; Op. Att'y Gen., Ohio No. 3289 (1962), 1 U.C.C. Rptg. Serv. 774 (Callaghan 1965)
(original signature not necessary) ; Op. Att'y Gen., Okla. No. 65-275 (1965), 2 U.C.C.
Rptg. Serv. 1177 (Callaghan 1966) (thermofax copy of a certified copy of a financing
statement is valid) ; Op. Att'y Gen., Okla. No. 63-249 (1963), 1 U.C.C. Rptg. Serv. 790
(Callaghan 1965) (carbon copy valid) ; Op. Att'y Gen., Va. May 25, 1965, 3 U.C.C.
Rptg. Serv. 248 (Callaghan 1967) (financing statement "signed" with any symbol is
acceptable) ; Op. Att'y Gen., Md., March 20, 1964, 2 U.C.C. Rptg. Serv. 104 (Callaghan
1966) (financing statement must meet all the requirements of § 9-402(1)).
31. 1 G. Gilmore, supra note 19.
32. See Benedict v. Lebowitz, 346 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1965) (although formal signa-
ture not required to effectuate a financing statement, "any symbol executed or adopted
by party with present intention to authenticate a writing" under § 1-201 (39) is
sufficient) ; In Re Excel Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1965) (financing statements
signed "Excel Dept. Stores" instead of "Excel Stores, Inc.," is a minor error, "not
seriously misleading") ; In Re Smith, 205 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (omission of
one or more of the statutory requirements of § 9-402(1) is fatal and a filing officer
may decline to receive it as being insufficient) ; In Re Horvath, 1 U.C.C. Rptg. Serv.
624 (Callaghan) (D. Conn. 1963) (typed name of scured party is sufficient authentica-
tion under § 9-402(1) ; In Re Bengston, 3 U.C.C. Rptg. Serv. 283 (Callaghan) (D.
Conn. 1965) (printed signature substantially complies with § 9-402(1)) ; In Re. Pen-
nar Paper Co., 2 U.C.C. Rptg. Serv. 659 (Callaghan) (E.D. Pa. 1964) (minimum
requirements of § 9-402 are necessary to constitute substantial compliance) ; In Re
Murray, 2 U.C.C. Rptg. Serv. 667 (Callaghan) (D. Ore. 1964) (if two secured parties,
both must sign financing statement) ; In Re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966)
(failure of secured party to fulfil any one of the requisites regarding to filing and
perfection preclude his asserting a security interest) ; In Re Carlstrom, 3 U.C.C. Rptg.
Serv. 766 (Callaghan) (N.D. Me. 1966) (minor errors which are seriously misleading
refer to such minor errors as misplacements, misspellings, and abbreviations; case re-
garded as a narrow interpretation as it required a "handwritten" signature) ; In Re
Kane, 58 Lanc. L. Rev. 273 (E.D. Pa. in Bankruptcy, 1962. Unreported) (photostatic
signature of debtor and secured party are not "signed" within meaning of § 9-402(1) ;
a narrow holding, but § 1-201(39) literally seems to require a mark or symbol) ; Cf.
Op. Att'y Gen., Ky. No. 64-708 (1964) (requires a manual signing upon photocopy);
National Cash Register Co. v. Firestone & Co., 346 Mass. 255, 191 N.E.2d 471 (1963)
(misspelled name of secured party is not seriously misleading) ; Sales Fin. Corp. v.
McDermott Appliance Co., 340 Mass 493, 165 N.E.2d 119 (1960) (abbreviation "Co."
for "company" is not misleading) ; Plemens v. Didde-Glaser, Inc., 244 Md. 556, 224
A.2d 464 (1966) (corporate officer's signing of financing statement without indication
of representative capacity substantially complies with § 9-402).
33. See note 29 supra.
34. Comment, Uniform Commercial Code-Liberal Interpretation of Financing
Statement Requirements, 41 Wash. L. Rev. 180, 186 (1966) ; See also note 19 supra.
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the signature requirement, consider the following quotation by the
court with their deleted words inserted in parenthesis:
A financing statement is sufficient if it (is signed by the debtor and
the secured party,) gives the [an] address of the secured party from
which information concerning the security interest may be obtained.
85
The lack of the secured party's address presented the supreme
court with a more difficult problem; however, it again relied on Pro-
fessor Gilmore's treatise as persuasive:
The addresses are required in the document which is filed for record
and for simplicity's sake might as well be included in the underlying
'agreement'. 
. ... 6
Consequently, the court determined that the instrument of July 12,
1963, did not meet the requirements of section 9-402 (1) and was
defective as a financing statement.8 7
In light of the foregoing discussion, which indicated the position
of the majority of jurisdictions as to what constitutes "substantial
compliance" with section 9-402, a statement made by the opinion
writer in Strevell, Judge Hensley, provides the most poignant crit-
icism of the court's handling of the case: "The filing system will
perform its intended function only if [the] secured party substan-
tially complies with the requirements of section 9-402 (1) " .. 8
On the one hand, courts must be careful not to allow a trifling
discrepancy to vitiate an otherwise valid financing statement; on the
other hand, they must be alert not to interpret a substantial error or
omission as "not seriously misleading" and, therefore, not detri-
mental to the statement's validity.89
With regard to section 9-402, the error in Strevell was of the
latter type. Both the Code and case law make a clear distinction as
to where the line should be drawn between the trifling discrepancy
and the seriously misleading error. Hopefully, our Supreme Court
35. See note 10 supra at 335, 422 P.2d at 369.
36. Sutra note 19.
37. Annot., Willier and Hart, U.C.C. Rep. Digest § 9-402, A-19 (1967): "While
the court did not expressly refer to the subsection, the result in the case was apparently
based upon section 9-402(5)." The court considered whether "in fact" the defendant
had due notice from the financing statement which was filed. Testimony, however,
indicated that defendant never inquired of Chavez as to his ownership nor did he
check the filing records. Record at 16. 77 N.M. 331 (1967).
38. See note 10 supra at 336, 422 P.2d at 369.
39. Cf. Alloway v. Stuart, 385 S.W.2d 41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964).
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will follow this distinction more closely in future cases involving
this section of the Code. Their failure to do so in this case is not
extraordinarily important since, as previously noted, the correct
decision was reached anyway. It is more important then, in that it
provided food for analysis and ex post facto criticism which, hope-
fully, will present some aspects of the case which the court may not
have considered.
JAMES D. GRIFFIN
